From Wealth to Power by Zakaria Fareed

Author:Zakaria, Fareed [Zakaria, Fareed]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781400829187
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Published: 0101-01-01T00:00:00+00:00

CHAPTER FIVE

The New Diplomacy, 1889-1908

THE EMERGENCE OF A GREAT

POWER

THE SECRETARY of the navy's Annual Report of 1889 marks a turning point in the history of American foreign relations. In it, Benjamin Tracy proposed that the United States construct two battleship fleets—one for the Pacific, one for the Atlantic—with a total of twenty battleships, sixty cruisers, and twenty coastal monitors, turning America into one of the world's great naval powers. The navy secretary's reasoning was clearly set out in the opening paragraphs of the report. He pointed out that many of Europe's leading states had "less than one-tenth of [America's] population, one-thirtieth of its wealth, and one-hundredth of its area," but, despite its superior resources, the United States did "not rank as a naval power." A chart that compared the naval strength of the world's eleven leading powers emphasized this point. To correct the imbalance between America's power and its low ranking, Tracy advocated a major, sustained naval buildup. Financing this buildup was not considered difficult: "We collect in duties in six months at a single port a greater sum than we could spend in building a new navy in six years." Tracy's reasoning comported perfectly with the state-centered realist hypothesis and its focus on increasing state power. Nowhere did the report suggest that new threats or hostile adversaries motivated its proposals. To be sure, the fleet would serve defensive purposes, but defense "absolutely requires a fighting force." Wars, while "defensive in principle," would always have to be conducted offensively. 1 The new navy was, for Tracy, the means by which the United States would assume its rightful place among the world's powers.

Two months later, Tracy released the report of the "policy board," a six-person committee of naval officers he had appointed to conduct an overall strategic review. In justifying a larger navy, the board laid out its theoretical assumptions in terms so explicit as to warm a scholar's heart. "[T]he magnitude of a naval force to be maintained by a government should be adjusted on the one hand to the chances of war . . . and, on the other hand, it should be commensurate with the wealth of the country and the interests at stake." If the threat of war was slight and the nation's interests minor, the navy could be small. If war was likely, a large navy was essential. However, "[w]hatever may be the chances of war, if the interests to be guarded are great then the naval force to be maintained should also be great." 2

The policy board frankly acknowledged that America's relative geographic isolation had blessed it with immense security that had only increased in recent years. "For the United States it may be confidently asserted that the chances of war with any nation comparable in wealth and power are much less than the chances among the nations of Europe." Indeed, the likelihood of such a war "would seem to be at a minimum." But despite the absence of threats, the board emphasized, a large navy was still vital.

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